📣 making better decisions together
- slides
- collective decision making
- how to convert collective will to singular will
- ex.
- in the small (~ where do we go for lunch?)
- in the medium (~ how should we run our corporation?)
- in the big (~ how should we run the nation?)
- in academia, these questions fall under...
- social choice theory, mechanism design (economics)
- ex. where should we go for lunch?
- (conceptually, each individual has "true" hidden preferences)
- (ex. A: 🌮🍕🍣 B: 🍕🌮🍣 C: 🍣🍕🌮)
- poll: single answer, most popular wins ("plurality" voting)
- hopefully, can intuit that this sucks
- "what" is wrong?
- there is a solution that makes the total happier
- "why" is it "bad"?
- broadly: it is lossy, GIGO
- (conceptually, each individual has "true" hidden preferences)
- a good "group decision making system" needs to capture information (people communicating what they want, how badly)
- will talk about...
- a few different ways to do voting
- but... before that, I need to address an important caveat
- voting is usually part of a larger "group decision making –system–"
- often can't improve things in isolation
- think holistically
- so, first talk about "systems" and then "mechanisms"
systems
members ------------------> decision (direct democracy)
vote
members -----> rep -------> decision ((single) representative democracy)
vote fiat
members -----> reps ------> decision (representative democracy)
vote vote
members ----> reps -\__~~~~> decision (real world political systems)
\---> rep -/
- simplest system: direct democracy
- members use some voting process to make decisions
- see this...
- small group decisions (our lunch example)
- in the large, most commonly: referendums
- with internet, could replace congress with a system of continuous digital referendums
- why might this be "bad"?
- does the voter have time to be informed?
- or are they just directly sharing preferences
- (if you force direct democracy on a group that is unwilling/unable of getting informed, they are prone to external manipulation)
- (politicians often call for referendums on topics to make them fail)
- ...and so, we often have representatives
- one representative to call the shots
- but really, for large groups, it's too much work for one person
- ...so a group of representatives
- and now we have voting to choose the reps... and the reps voting...
- in the real world... much more complicated
- constitutions
- system of checks and balances
- distribution of powers
- there is a lot of "design freedom" in these systems
- multi-layer plurality
- we've got this flawed thing... let's do it twice
- forced into strategic voting
- (can't vote for my preferred choice, because they have no chance)
- (IMO the most disenfranchising system one could design)
- alternatives?
- could replace the mechanism for voting (but leave other parts the same)
- sometimes better, sometimes worse; it depends on how it interacts
- but, can do bigger "re-architectures":
- ranked votings... w/ two candidate ridings
- proportional
- popular vote determines the party proportion in parliament
- but other mechanism determines the specific politicians
- (over 85 democratic countries transitioned from the plurality system to proportional, and now overwhelming majority use it)
- sortition (choose citizens randomly), but, into more smaller committees
- jury duty
- ancient greece (multiple committees)
- citizen's assemblies (ex. for drawing district boundaries)
mechanisms
- from the big picture, let's get back to the little picture: voting mechanisms
- as we've saw, can be used in...
- choosing directly (particularly in small groups)
- choosing representatives
- our representatives making choices
- voting
- plurality voting (first past the post)
- ballot: mark a single choice
- integration: highest count wins
- comments:
- (strategic voting, often leads to poor outcomes)
- (we've talked enough about it)
- ranked voting
- ballot: rank choices
- integration: many ways, with slightly different outcomes
- (DECIDEDLY PLUG)
- comments:
- arrow's theorem: none of these have all the intuitive properties we think are fair
- A B and C -> A wins
- if clone A, B now wins :/
- if remove C, B now wins :/
- (10 or so others)
- score/approval voting
- ballot: rate a choice on some scale (from 0 to 10; or could just be 0 or 1)
- integration: sum it up
- comments:
- works well because it captures all the inherent preferences
- (now my preferred voting mechanism)
- ...in theory, can still vote strategically
- alternatives to voting mechanisms:
- markets
- in the large, markets are also a way "for groups to integrate individual preferences over how to manage shared resources"
- "free" markets
- directly involve individual preferences, and their magnitudes
- auctions
- many kinds
- studied, designed to incentive participants to participate truthfully
- ie. the best strategy is to just reveal their true preference
- (ROOMMATES CHORE AUCTION)
- quadratic voting
- score voting, but, with quadratic cost increase (1 = 1, 2 = 4, ...)
- more accurately matches the micro-economics
- author suggests idea of referendums where you pay normal money
- (QUADVOTE PLUG)
- consensus
- point is deliberation
- deliberation as the way of developing common understanding and discovering preferences
- (gets a bad rap, lack of knowledge how to do well, so facilitated poorly)
- examples
- canadian native communities
- sociocracy
- functioning relationships
- sortition
- choose randomly from a population of eligible and willing candidates
- imo, under-explored
conclusion
- we talked about systems
- direct decision making
- or, involving representatives
- with lots of potential checks and balances
- we talked about mechanisms
- single choice, ranked choice, scoring and quadratic scoring
- ...and alternatives to voting
- markets
- consensus
- sortitition
- when something is popular, easy to fall into the trap of thinking it's optimal
- but often it's just an artefact of history that is entrenched (stuck in a local maximum)
- "it's the way things have been done"
- "easy / simple"
- ...are excuses for systematic disenfranchisement
- there are many ways to make decisions as a group
- which are appropriate depends on the context
- (except plurality voting - it just sucks)
SCRAPS
- even dictators need to incentive others (machiavellian analysis)
- are some "systems" "better" than others?
- design for good (and design for evil)
- voting systems motivate certain behaviour in their candidates
- democracy in the large
- meta-politics
- can design systems that oppress
- how limit the tyranny of the majority
- in governments, delegate the decision to "decide what is good/right"